

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD503247	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; JUN 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY	
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (6 Jun 69)

FOR OT UT ~~691350~~

13 June 1969


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT AFFECTS THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND IS PROTECTED BY THE ESPIONAGE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 794. IT IS TRANSMITTED AND RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE AND ITS DISCLOSURE TO ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command

US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army War College

US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Armor School

US Army Combat Surveillance School

US Army Field Artillery School

US Army Infantry School

US Army Intelligence School

US Army Military Police School

US Army Ordnance School

US Army Quartermaster School

US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AD 503247

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Research and Development

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Engineers

Director, Defense Research and Engineering

CG, US Army Materiel Command

Defense Documentation Center

Commanding Officers

US Army Limited War Laboratory

US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

8th Transportation Group

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96226

AVCA QN-TO-3

7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)
for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCA QN-OO-H
APO 96238

TO: Assistant C of S for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D. C. 20310

SECTION I

Operations: Significant Activities

A. COMMAND: (U)

1. The 8th Transportation Group (MT) engaged in operations during the 92 days of this reporting period.
2. LTC William R. SARBBER, Jr. assumed command of the 54th Transportation Battalion on 8 January 1969.
3. The principal staff members assisting Colonel Garland A. Ludy, Group Commander were: LTC Raymond L. Farmer, Deputy Commander; Major Dywane D. Cudo, S-3; Major Glenn W. Long, Signal Officer/Asst S3; Captain Chester A. Bishop, Jr, S-2; Captain Thomas S. Kilbane, S-2 and Captain Robert P. Coleman, S-4.
4. The following visitors were recorded on the Group visitors' register on the dates indicated:
 - 7 Nov 68 - COL John M. Bennett, Trans Div, MACV J-45
 - 21 Nov 68 - Mr. Binder, Editor, Army magazine
 - 21 Nov 68 - COL Marshall M. Motes, CO, USAD
 - 25 Nov 68 - COL John S. Murray, DOT, Com Ranh Bay
 - 1 Dec 68 - BG Charles W. Ryder, Jr., G1, USARPAC

FOR OT UT
691324 INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

1

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

7 February 1969

12 Jan 69 - COL V.C. Guerin, Acting G4, USARPAC
 12 Jan 69 - COL Burton F. Hood, Deputy G4, USARV
 14 Jan 69 - BG Elry E. Roberts, DCS/Plans & Opns, USARV
 16 Jan 69 - LTC Chang, G4, ROK Tiger Division
 24 Jan 69 - COL Thome T. Everton, CO, 593rd Gen Spt Gp
 24 Jan 69 - COL John E. Truog, CO, 5th Trans Comd

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE: (U)

1. During the reporting period, the 8th Transportation Group (MT) was under strength an average of 222 personnel.

2. In December and January, an intensive program was undertaken to rewrite all 8th Group standard operating procedures, policy letters and other directives as regulations. This program has been successfully completed.

3. The number of court martials increased significantly in this reporting period: November (1), December (6), and January (12). Over half the cases consisted of charges of sleeping on guard or other sentinel offenses.

4. 8th Transportation Group assumed special court martial jurisdiction of the 124th Transportation Battalion on 5 December 1968. Previously, the Floiky Sub Area Command, now the 45th GS Gp, had jurisdiction.

C. OPERATIONS: (C)

1. During this reporting period, task vehicles of this command traveled 4,375,581 miles hauling 260,455 tons of cargo, 6,431,562 gallons of POL and 7,406 passengers. The 8th Group amassed a total of 16,761,474 ton miles.

2. The number of hostile incidents in which 8th Group convoys were involved are as follows:

Ambushes - 6

Sniping - 15

Mining - 3

The net results of those encounters were:

Friendly KHA - 5 WHA - 17

Enemy (known) - KHA - 2

Vehicles Damaged - 39

ROI's - 353

Tonnage not moved due to enemy activity - 3176 S/T's

-2-

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA QN-TO-3

7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)
for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

3. The volume of enemy hostility required the continued presence of gun trucks in order to lay down a suppressive base of fire in the critical first 10-15 minutes of an ambush prior to the arrival of the tactical reaction force. This internal firepower coupled with the command's policy to keep moving if caught in the kill zone, coupled with an enforced 100 meter interval between vehicles, contributed significantly to keeping down the number of friendly casualties in ambushes sprung by company sized NVL/VC forces.

4. The 50th Transportation Company of the 27th Transportation Battalion was brought to zero balance in equipment and personnel on 2 November 1968.

5. The 529th Transportation Company (Light Truck-2½ Ton) in Phu Hiep, RVN and the 545th Transportation Company (Light Truck-5 Ton) Vung Ro Bay, RVN were assigned to the 8th Transportation Group and attached to the 54th Transportation Battalion on 1 December 1968.

6. The Goor Company (Provisional) in Pleiku was dispatched TDY to Chu Lai I. CTZ on 8 December 1968.

7. On 12 December 1968, the 529th Transportation Company became inoperable due to a virtual zoning out of its personnel and equipment in order to bring other units within the command up to strength.

8. The 359th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Tanker) in Pleiku was assigned to the 8th Transportation Group on 1 January 1969. The 8th Group attached this unit to the 124th Transportation Battalion.

9. On 10 January 1969, the 545th Transportation Company received orders for a permanent change of station from Vung Ro Bay to the better physical facilities of Phu Hiep which had been vacated by the 529th Transportation Company. This move also enabled the 545th to achieve a better defense posture due to terrain advantages.

10. On 28 January 1969, a Trailer Transfer Point was established at the 4th Division Camp Encri to expedite trailer turnaround time.

D. TRAINING: (U)

1. Training was conducted in accordance with the master training schedules and applicable training directives to the maximum extent possible. Due to the rotation of the 8th Transportation Group units nearly all training was conducted in the evenings. There were exceptions for driver training and for the initial in-country orientation. There were 92 days of training in this reporting period.

2. Driver training was conducted on a continuing basis by each battalion. It consisted of classroom orientation and on-the-job training which included driving in convoys while under the supervision of a trained driver. Due to the absence of school trained 5 Ton Tractor drivers in the replacement stream, much valuable time was spent on training such drivers, whereas if training had been received in CONUS it would have substantially shortened such training and consequently would have resulted in an increased operational output.

-3-

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA QN-TG-3

7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)
for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

3. In addition to continued emphasis on weapons familiarization and battle-sight scoring, the Group required all convoy commanders to attend forward observation school in An Kho. Also, the Group conducted classes on gunship/dustoff procedures.

E. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY: (C)

1. Based on the wide-spread road net traveled by units of the 8th Group to reach many varied destinations each day, convoy commanders and other personnel were afforded the opportunity to gather important intelligence information. Information concerning road and bridge conditions, suspected enemy locations and anticipated enemy activity was gathered and disseminated to all convoy commanders and to all units. The Highway 19 Coordinator has been an excellent source of information concerning enemy activity on that route.

2. During the reporting period there have been two major attacks and numerous sniping incidents in Sub-Installation Bravo, a 50 square mile defense sector for which 8th Transportation Group is responsible. On 21 November 1968, an estimated VC platoon ambushed an 8th Group night shuttle convoy with rockets, automatic weapons, small arms and grenades resulting in 3 US KIA, 10 US WIA, 11 vehicles damaged and 1 enemy KIA. The second major attack occurred in the early hours of 23 January 1969 when an estimated VC sapper squad attacked an adjacent unit, the 66th MP Company, with rockets, satchel charges and automatic weapons resulting in 1 US WIA, an NCO club completely destroyed, 2 enemy KIA, 21 hand grenades, 3 satchel charges and 3 unexpended B-40 rounds CIL. In scattered actions throughout Sub-Installation Bravo during the reporting period, 5 more VC were confirmed as KIA.

3. An intensive physical security inspection campaign has been conducted in Sub-Installation Bravo by field grade officers, unit security officers, company grade officers and NCO's in preparation for a possible Tet offensive. The 8th Transportation Group SITOC (Sub-Installation Tactical Operations Center) has coordinated this campaign and implemented it with many security directives including comprehensive physical security regulation.

4. Units within Sub-Installation Bravo also upgraded physical security plans. These units also continued to feed spot intelligence reports to SITOC.

5. 8th Transportation Group instructed all Sub-Installation Bravo units to conduct comco checks between the guard towers and the CP every 30 minutes in order to keep the guards alert and provide continuous testing of comco equipment. Moreover, subordinate units of this command were instructed to make provision for the serving of hot soup and coffee to guards on night duty once before and once after midnight.

F. LOGISTICS: (U)

1. Since the last reporting period, 8th Transportation Group has experienced increased difficulty in obtaining necessary replacements of mission essential vehicles required to perform our line haul mission.

2. The dissolvement of our light and medium truck companies during this period

-4-

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVCA QN-TG-3

7 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)
for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCE CSFOR-65 (R-1)

came to a complete halt. The high wash out rate of multifuels has caused an appreciable loss to our overall load carrying capacity. At present 8th Transportation Group total assets on hand are 40.4% of total authorized strength for 5 Ton Cargo Trucks and 80% for 5 Ton Tractors, of which 7.3% are multifuel vehicles.

3. Since the implementation of the Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility, the deadline rate has been reduced, better accountability has been established, and the overall trailer maintenance posture of the 8th Group 12 ton S&P semitrailer fleet has greatly improved.

4. Within the last 92 days 8th Transportation Group has established both a CMMI and AOI team. Personnel making up the team have come from the various staff sections of this headquarters. A detailed schedule has been implemented whereby every unit within 8th Group is inspected on a recurring basis.

-5-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECTION II

Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

A. PERSONNEL (U): None

B. OPERATIONS (U)

1. ITEM: Modification of Hardened Vehicle Concept

(a) OBSERVATION: The 8th Transportation Group under the leadership of Colonel Garland A. Ludy modified, in November, the "Hardened Vehicle Concept" which it innovated in October of 1967. This concept called for the armor plating and arming of task force vehicles for interpersal within the convoy in order to provide a suppressive base of fire against hostile ambush forces. The concept originally called for a march unit of ten task vehicles headed by a radio "gun jeep" and a "hardened vehicle", known by the drivers as a "gun truck". The original concept also called for an armored truck, upon which a quad-fifty would be mounted, to take up the middle space in this march unit and for another radio "gun jeep" in the rear to provide control. The quad-fifty was deleted as an essential part of the march unit due to the scarcity of these potent quad-fifties within the command. Instead, the quad-fifty is used on an "as available" basis and usually assigned to the convoy from Qui Nhon to Pleiku which consists of many march units. Also, the lead "gun truck" was replaced by a reconnaissance gun jeep whose mission is to scout the terrain ahead of the march unit for signs of enemy forces or obstacles such as a blown out bridge preceding the march unit. The replaced "gun truck" still remains in the march unit, but now varies position throughout the march unit daily so that the enemy ambush units will not be able to anticipate placement of this potent retaliatory force. Experience indicated that when the "gun truck" was in the lead it was more susceptible to ambush and enemy fire. Enemy gunners would know, after several days of observation, where the "gun truck" would be in the column and consequently they frequently took under fire the convoy's retaliatory firepower as the primary initial target. By not being in the front of the column, the "gun truck" can move up to the rescue of ambushed task vehicles in its march unit for more easily, especially if placed to the rear of the unit. The original concept provided the enemy the opportunity to permit the "gun truck" to pass through the kill zone and then unleash their firepower on the trailing, comparatively helpless task vehicles. Finally, a control vehicle (also a jeep w/a mounted M-60 machine gun) has been retained in the march unit but it has been directed to police the column rather than remain in a static position in the unit as had been the practice previously.

(b) EVALUATION: The "Hardened Vehicle Concept" has been modified to accommodate itself more to the tactical situation and the number of improvised hardened vehicles available, as well as to enable better control, security and reconnaissance.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That other units which are engaged in convoy operations in RVN review their hardened vehicle policy to ensure that such policy corresponds with the modification in the "Hardened Vehicle Concept" successfully implemented by the 8th Transportation Group.

2. ITEM: Integration of Assets

(a) OBSERVATION: The 359th Transportation Company (Medium Truck-Tanker) was

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

detached from the 240th QM Battalion and assigned to the 8th Transportation Group on 1 January 1969.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The addition of this tanker company not only gave this Group more versatility but also greatly enhanced the Group's flexibility and responsiveness to customer demand. If there is a heavy demand for POL, all tankers in the 359th can now be utilized since 5 ton tractors can be supplied from the Group's Medium Truck (Cargo) Companies to replace any of the 359th's deadlined tractors. Conversely, if POL demand is light, the 359th tractors are pressed into both shuttle and line haul for the Medium Truck (Cargo) Companies.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That support commands examine the feasibility of placing all transportation companies under the transportation group in its area in order to obtain versatility, increased flexibility and more efficient utilization of transportation assets.

3. ITEM: Litters and First Aid Containers in Gun Trucks.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** 8th Transportation Group has experienced ambushes where men have been wounded and had to be evacuated out of the kill zone by gun trucks in order to reach a secure area where DUSTOFF could then pick them up.

(b) **EVALUATION:** 8th Group now requires each gun truck to carry two litters and a first aid container in order that the gun crew may be prepared to both administer first aid and to evacuate our wounded out of the kill zone to a more secure area.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That this requirement be adopted throughout RVN in convoy operations.

C. TRAINING (U)

ITEM: School Trained 5 Ton Tractor Drivers

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Very few of the many 5 ton tractor driver replacements that arrive at this Group are school trained for their job.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Much valuable time that could be spent fulfilling operational requirements is devoted instead to training 5 ton tractor driver replacements who have never been school trained in that capacity. Moreover, it would probably improve the safety factor if replacement drivers were schooled in how to drive a 5 ton tractor and how to pull a 12 ton S&P prior to arrival in RVN.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That COMARC institute a training program to ensure that replacements for 5 ton tractor driver TOE positions are school trained prior to arrival in RVN.

L. INTELLIGENCE (U)

ITEM: Guard Tower Coordinates

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The SITOC has the grid coordinates of each numbered guard tower in Sub-Installation Drive posted in its operations bunker.

-7-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b) **EVALUATION:** Ready access to these grid coordinates has proven invaluable in calling in artillery fire into the area where hostile fire has been detected. Since the grid tower number can be swiftly translated into grid coordinates, fire direction and adjustment are rapid.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That all units have ready access to the coordinates of their manned positions in order to rapidly provide accurate fire missions to both artillery and gunships.

E. LOGISTICS (U)

1. ITEM: Low Priority of Issue

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The 15 combat losses of various types of mission essential vehicles, vehicles that have become unserviceable due to fair wear and tear, and accidental damages have greatly reduced the 8th Transportation Group's overall desired capability in our line haul mission.

(b) **EVALUATION:** In the overall operation of the task vehicle fleet it is becoming increasingly clear that the present wash out rate will seriously hinder our load carrying capability in performing our line haul mission.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. That a higher priority be placed on the issuing of replacement task vehicles to insure movement of all types of supplies in the combat zone.
2. That wash out criteria should be established for each specific type of vehicle so an orderly withdrawal can be made of these vehicles and suitable replacements be made available on a timely basis.
3. That a number of vehicles equivalent to 10% of our overall fleet be held in depot stock for combat losses and other emergency replacements.

2. ITEM: Dieselization of 5 Ton Truck Cargo and 5 Ton Truck Tractor.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The multifuel 5 ton vehicles have become an increased maintenance problem because of age, mileage, wear and tear, and other malfunctions. This causes a very high number of multifuels to be washed out at a time when there are no Mack Diesel Trucks in this Support Command available as replacements. The 8th Group has 240 of the 5 ton cargo trucks authorized and 97 on hand, 42 of which are multifuels. In most cases these multifuel vehicles should be returned for rebuild and/or washed out of the system. The 563rd Transportation Company, a medium truck unit, containing multifuel 5 ton tractors, is operating at below 50% capability.

(b) **EVALUATION:** To eliminate a serious maintenance problem and to get better performance out of a task vehicle, those multifuels should be replaced by Mack Diesel Trucks/Tractors. Not only would this standardize maintenance support in the combat zone but also would enable evacuation of these vehicles while still rebuildable.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That an intensive effort be made to proceed with the dieselization program for all vehicles engaged in combat service support.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. ITEM: Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility

(a) OBSERVATION: The progress made since the last reporting period has proven that the Centralized Trailer Maintenance Facility has accomplished more than previously expected. Through an expedient running repair shop and the establishment of scheduled services, the overall trailer deadline rate has been reduced to 20%.

(b) EVALUATION: At the present time 20% of the trailers in the fleet have received their scheduled service through the maintenance facility. Consequently, it is probable that the deadline rate will be even lower when all of the trailer fleet have received scheduled services.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That consolidated trailer maintenance be considered in Army wide planning of trailer transfer operations.

4. ITEM: Inspection Terms

(a) OBSERVATION: Prior to the initiation of the 8th Group CMMI and AGI Terms, units being inspected by higher headquarters were in most cases marginal and in some cases unsatisfactory. This was due in part to the shortage of qualified personnel at company level.

(b) EVALUATION: Every unit of the 8th Group has been inspected either as a courtesy or as a Pre-AGI/CMMI. As a result of these inspections units have received higher scores by visiting headquarters and the overall proficiency, which includes supply accountability, records management, utilization of manpower and equipment, better living conditions, mess management and maintenance management, is considerably higher. These inspections have also served as a very important tool in the training of newly assigned personnel and establishing goals which are consistent with the accomplishments of our mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continual emphasis be placed by group and battalion headquarters on skilled advice and inspections of subordinate units in order to insure that high standards are being maintained.

F. ORGANIZATION: None

G. OTHER: None

-9-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION III

Headquarters, Department of Army Survey Information

This organization has had no escape, evasion and survival experience during this reporting period or prior reporting periods.

1 Incl
as

Garland A. Luby
GARLAND A. LUBY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

8-ea Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

2-ea Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOR-OT
APO 96558

3-ea Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST

2-ea Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: GO-O
APO 96384

2-ea Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon
ATTN: AVCM QN-GO-H

2-ea File

AVCA QN-CO-H (7 Feb 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO 96238 2 8 MAR 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO 96384

The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 from the 8th Transportation Group (MT) has been reviewed and is considered adequate with the following comments:

a. SECTION 1, paragraph E5: Concur. More widespread employment of this policy might improve guard post security at other installations.

b. SECTION 2, paragraph B1: Nonconcur. The positioning of the hardened vehicles (gun trucks) will vary according to road conditions, number of vehicles in the convoy, and numbers of hardened vehicles available. The positioning of the gun trucks does not change the concept.

c. SECTION 2, paragraph B2: Concur. This policy would also clarify a number of chains-of-command.

d. SECTION 2, paragraph B3: Concur. Recommend higher headquarters initiate action on this matter.

e. SECTION 2, paragraph C: Concur. The burden of training drivers should not be placed upon units in the field. Action by higher headquarters is required.

f. SECTION 2, paragraph D: Concur. Failure to have accurate coordinates of fixed positions readily available could easily prove crucial in event of attack.

g. SECTION 2, paragraph E1: Concur with recommendations (c) 1 and 2. A policy presently in effect establishes higher priority for combat losses and replacements for washouts when organizational shortages reach the critical stage. Nonconcur with recommendation (c) 3 of paragraph E1. This matter is controlled by the Department of the Army, Distribution and Allocation Committee. The supply system is currently unable to fill existing shortages; due to this critical posture, distribution is limited to established authorizations only.

AVCA QN-GO-H (7 Feb 69)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for the Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

h. SECTION 2, paragraph E2: Concur. The Mack diesel truck has increased the operational-ready rate of the five-ton truck fleet.


i. SECTION 2, paragraph E3: Concur. The observation and evaluation sections of this paragraph illustrate the potential value of consolidated trailer maintenance facilities.

j. SECTION 2, paragraph E4: Concur. The information on inspection improvement is correct.

k. SECTION 3, Escape, Evasion and Survival information for this reporting period was not required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TELE: QNL 2338


RICHARD A. DANIELS
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-MH (7 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 8th Transportation Group for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. 24 APR 1969

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "hardened vehicles" concept, section II, page 6, paragraph b(1). Concur with paragraph b, 1st Indorsement. The concept of the hardened vehicles in convoys is not, and never was an issue. The observation points out that variation and avoidance of patterns are techniques used successfully to foil enemy ambush plans. These innovations will be submitted for publication in the USARV Transportation Newsletter for dissemination to TC units throughout Vietnam.

b. Reference item concerning litters and first aid containers in gun trucks, section II, page 7, paragraph b(3). Concur with actions taken to facilitate evacuation of casualties.

c. Reference item concerning school trained 5 ton tractor drivers, section II, page 7, paragraph c. Concur. Problems resulting from the shortage of trained heavy vehicle drivers have been reported to higher headquarters and programs designed to bring relief are being considered at Department of the Army and CONARC level. Until this problem is resolved and a training program is implemented, training of drivers will have to be accomplished within RVN.

d. Reference item concerning low priority of issue, section II, page 8, paragraph e(1). Concur with paragraph g, 1st Indorsement.

e. Reference item concerning dieselization of 5 ton truck cargo and 5 ton truck tractor, section II, page 8, paragraph e(2). Concur. A maximum effort is being made to dieselize primarily the 5 ton tractors in Qui Nhon Support Command. The dieselization of 5 ton trucks is also receiving maximum attention, even though the criticality of this item Army wide makes it difficult to fill all requisitions with diesel vehicles. Therefore, some replacements may be either gas, multifuel or diesel.

AVCA GO-MH (7 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 8th Transportation
Group for Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.24 APR 1969

f. Reference item concerning centralized trailer maintenance facility, section II, page 9, paragraph e(3). Concur. Decisions to operate centralized trailer maintenance facility should be made based on local operating conditions. This concept is being used in varying degrees throughout RVN and has proved successful.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon
8th Trans Group

AVHGC-DST (7 Feb 69) 3d Ind

28 APR 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)
for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
8th Trans Gp
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (7 Feb 69) 4th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 8th Trans Gp (Motor Transport) for
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 31 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


G. E. HOLEYFIELD
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG



Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		20. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310		Confidential
		21. GROUP
		4
2. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 31 Oct 68 to 31 Jan 69.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
CO, 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)		
6. REPORT DATE	72. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	73. NO. OF REFS
7 February 1969	20	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	691350	
b. PROJECT NO.	8b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
c. N/A		
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER EOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.